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WAR CRIMES AND THE LIMITS
OF LEGALISM
Gary Jonathan Bass*
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFrER GENOCIDE AND MAss VIOLENCE. By Martha Minow. Bos
ton: Beacon Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 214. $23.

MAss ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW. By Mark
Osiel. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 1997. Pp. x, 317. $34.95.
I.
In April 1945, Sir John Simon, Britain's Lord Chancellor, drew
up a memorandum that was the last gasp in the diplomatic struggle
against Nuremberg. Under American pressure, and despite British
objections, the Allies were poised to agree to put the Axis leader
ship on trial for war crimes. In the kind of magnificent understate
ment that the British government could sometimes inadvertently
achieve, it was entitled "The Argument for Summary Process
against Hitler & Co. " The memorandum was a series of arguments
to be used by the British delegation at the San Francisco conference
in a last-ditch effort to win over the Americans and Soviets.
Simon's case was simple: the Nazi leaders deserved to be punished,
but trials were not the way to do that. Simon feared that a trial of
the Nazi leadership would drag on, wear out public interest,
unearth embarrassing facts, and allow the Nazis a final chance to
make propaganda. The legal difficulties also seemed daunting. It
would be nightmarish to merge the American, British, and Soviet
legal traditions. Nor was it clear that aggression - which was to be
the main charge at Nuremberg and the focus of the American pros
ecution - could be considered a war crime in any conventional
sense. If the Nazi defense managed to score a few small victories,
the trial might be denounced as "a farce." So Simon had a simpler
solution: avoid the niceties of a trial and just shoot the Nazi
leaders.1
* Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University. A.B.
1992, A.M. 1995, Ph.D. 1998, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Great Britain Pub. Records Office (PRO), Kew, London: CAB 66165, W.P. (45) 281,
Simon memorandum, "War Criminals: Annex B: The Argument for Su=ary Process
against Hitler & Co.," May 3, 1945.
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These arguments were to be quashed. Led by Henry Stimson,
Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of War, the American government
was determined to have sweeping trials for the Nazi war criminals.
In the face of this, Britain decided not to push Simon's argument
any further but to acquiesce with the wishes of its more powerful
American ally with as much good grace as could be mustered.2
Whether one agrees with them - and I don't - Simon's argu
ments were not weak ones. But they are strange to hear neverthe
less. Nuremberg is seen in retrospect as so unimpeachable, an act
of such extraordinary restraint and justice, that it is disturbing to
hear that it was fought with such pragmatic objections. When con
sidering a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and then
another one for Rwanda, the United Nations did not air such de
bates. To the contrary, there is a kind of orthodoxy in human rights
circles that regards it as almost self-evident that war crimes deserve
war crimes trials. So many of the arguments against war crimes tri
als have been made in bad faith - by apologists for Serb or Croat
nationalists and Hutu genocidaires, who do not really question le
galistic methods but the need for punishment itself - that it is easy
to forget that there are some reasonable arguments made in good
faith against the trials.
At a minimum, this protribunal orthodoxy is a post-Nuremberg
artifact. Many scholars and diplomats have questioned whether
war crimes and mass atrocities can properly be reduced to legal
questions. While the Nuremberg trials were in session, Hannah
Arendt wrote to Karl Jaspers, a German intellectual:
Your definition of Nazi policy as a crime ("criminal guilt") strikes me
as questionable. The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits
of the law; and that is precisely what constitutes their monstrousness.
For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough. It may well be
essential to hang Goring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this
guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and
all legal systems. That is the reason why the Nazis in Nuremberg are
so smug.3

Other thinkers, less commendably, have been more worried about
the purity of American law than about punishing foreign war
criminals. During Nuremberg, at the Supreme Court itself, Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was quietly indignant that Justice Robert
Jackson was away serving as the American chief prosecutor at the
Allied tribunal:
So far as the Nuremberg trial is an attempt to justify the application
of the power of the victor to the vanquished because the vanquished

2. CAB 65/50, War Cabinet 57, W.M. (45) 57, May 3, 1945, 6 p.m., pp. 331-32.
3. Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers (Aug. 17, 1946), in HANNAH AREND T AND
KARL JASPERS: CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 51, 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds.,
Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber, trans. 1992).
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made aggressive war . . . I dislike extremely to see it dressed up with a
false fa<;ade of legality.

. . . It would not disturb me greatly . . if that power were openly
and frankly used to punish the German leaders for being a bad lot,
but it disturbs me some to have it dressed up in the habiliments of the
common law and the Constitutional safeguards to those charged with
crime. . . .
.

. . . Jackson is away conducting his high-grade lynching party in
Nuremberg . . . . I don't mind what he does to the Nazis, but I hate to
see the pretense that he is running a court and proceeding according
to common law. This is a little too sanctimonious a fraud to meet my
old-fashioned ideas.4

And in his book Profiles in Courage, John F. Kennedy dedicated a
rather unconvincing chapter to praising Senator Robert Taft for ob
jecting to Nuremberg as a betrayal of American legal standards.5
There have also been more political objections. As World War I
was drawing to an end, David Lloyd George, the British Prime
Minister, tried to persuade the Imperial War Cabinet to approve
war crimes trials for Kaiser Wilhelm II and other Germans. But
Lloyd George found few takers at first. Jan Smuts, South Africa's
Defense Minister, was not sure that Wilhelm II had committed any
definite crime. W.M. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, was
emphatic that Wilhelm II could not be put on trial si.nlply for start
ing the war. Austen Chamberlain did not want to make a martyr of
Wilhelm II by singling him out for trial. Winston Churchill himself
had, in 1915, been enthusiastic about punishing U-boat crews, but
in 1918, as Minister of Munitions, worried:
It does seem to me that you might easily set out hopefully on the path
of hanging the ex-Kaiser and have general public interest taken in it,
but after a time you might find you were in a very great impasse, and
the lawyers all over the world would begin to see that the indictment
was not capable of being sustained. 6

It was not only the British who had reservations. Cordell Hull,
Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of State, and Henry Morgenthau Jr.,
Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, both preferred summary exe
cution to trials for Nazi war criminals. Henry Stimson, Roosevelt's
Secretary of War, was the administration's foremost advocate both
of war crimes trials and a generous settlement that would not hu
miliate Germany. This generosity was presumably easier for
Stimson because he, and the War Department, had never been no4. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HAru.AN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF TIIE LAW 715-16 {1956)
(quoting letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Luther Ely Smith Jan. 2, 1946) (citations omitted).
For a rebuttal, see, for instance, RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JurusPRUDENCE
228-39 (1990).
5. See JoHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 261-77 (memorial ed. 1964).
6. CAB 23/43, Imperial War Cabinet 37, Nov. 20, 1918, noon.
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ticeably exercised about the extermination of the Jews. But more
than any other member of Roosevelt's cabinet, Morgenthau tried to
stop the Holocaust; and once the war was coming to a close, he was
too angry to contemplate giving the Nazis the luxury of a trial.7
Morgenthau's rage was certainly immoderate, but it was in the
same vein as Arendt's critique of Nuremberg. Morgenthau and his
staff at one point in 1944 were considering as many as 2,500 such
executions.8 These plans for summary execution were enshrined in
the Morgenthau Plan, a document calling for a tough peace that
would pastoralize Germany lest it ever threaten Europe's peace
again. At the Quebec Conference in 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill
agreed to follow Morgenthau's lead. It was only after the
Morgenthau Plan was leaked to the press that Roosevelt turned to
Stimson's plans for war crimes trials. Morgenthau did not recant.
He did not want the punishment of Nazis undercut by legal niceties.
For Morgenthau, justice and law were not always the same thing.
"I'm not a lawyer," Morgenthau said in June 1945, as the planning
of Nuremberg dragged on. "Is there any reason they can't cut all of
this monkey-business out and go right to the military tribunal?"9

In retrospect, it is clear that Morgenthau and Hull had got the
wrong end of the argument. We are right to reserve our highest
praise for the people who made Nuremberg the triumph it was, like
Jackson and Telford Taylor.10 But even the success of Nuremberg
does not necessarily mean that trials will always work. The trials
held after World War I, in Leipzig and in Constantinople, degener
ated into disaster.11 The Tokyo tribunal was far less impressive
than Nuremberg, and seems to have made less of a contribution to
Japan's postwar development away from militarism.12
Is law really the best way to address such atrocities? As Simon
and others would point out, there are many reasons to be skeptical.
7. See generally DAVID S. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF TIIE JEws: AMErucA AND
HOLOCAUST, 1941-1945 {1984) {discussing the Roosevelt administration's handling of
the Holocaust).
8. See 1 HENRY MoRGENTIIAU, JR., SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90nl: CoNo.,
MoRGENTIIAU DIARY (GERMANY) 486 (Co=. Print 1967).
9. Id. at 1561.
10. See TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEM·
om {1992). By Jackson, see variously, ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE CASE AGAINST TIIE NAZI
WAR CRJMINALS: OPENING STATEMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMErucA, AND 0TIIER
DOCUMENTS {1946); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NORNBERG CASE {1947); REPORT OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFER·
ENCE ON MILITARY TRJALS, LoNDoN, 1945 {1949); Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to
WHITNEY R. HARrus, TYRANNY ON TRJAL: THE EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG xxix {1954).
11. See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY
OF PUNISHING WAR CRJMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982).
12. See IAN BuRUMA, THE WAGES OF GmL"r: MEMoRJES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND
JAPAN {1995); JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD
WAR II, 443-84 {1999).
THE
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Law is an inflexible instrument, and the chaos of war and atrocity
stubbornly resists shoehorning into neat legal categories. Legal
goals may be at odds with those of politics. Or they may be at odds
with a commonsensical understanding of substantive justice. Or the
mix of politics with law may end up cheapening the law. The
human rights orthodoxy - that trials are invariably helpful - may,
in the end, be right; but it is not so self-evident or so uncomplicated
that it should be beyond argument. Are war crimes trials really al
ways the right way to go?
II.
Martha Minow13 is a quiet skeptic. The thrust of her thoughtful
and humane book is that there is a broad spectrum of possible
measures to try to cope with the aftermath of war or atrocity and
that trials are only one possible notch along it. She asks: "Must all
such societies pursue prosecutions in order to comply with interna
tional human rights standards?" (p. 2). Quite unlike those lawyers
who see justice as a matter of law or nothing, Minow is acutely
aware of how little law can actually accomplish in an unstable polit
ical climate. Minow upbraids the advocates of trials for overselling
the virtues of their preferred solution, hyping trials as capable of
grand tasks like deterring war crimes and rebuilding shattered soci
eties (pp. 48-49).
Minow has no such illusions. She admits that almost any re
sponse - whether legalistic or not - to mass atrocity will be insuf
ficient. She presents a long list of possible alternative responses,
without placing too much hope in any of them: truth commissions,
purges, reparations, apologies, memorials, naming names, and pub
lic education (p. 23). She is not quite sure what will work, and is
acutely aware of the difficult line that must be walked "between too
much memory and too much forgetting" (p. 1 18). Trials are only
one part of the story.
But Minow is, of course, an expert on law, and it is for trials that
she reserves her most stem language. She warns that the grandiose
claims of international legalists not only go too far, they tend to
breed cynicism when tribunals stumble under too heavy a load. As
she puts it:
I do not think it wise to claim that international and domestic prose
cutions for war crimes and other horrors themselves create an inter
national moral and legal order, prevent genocides, or forge the
political transformation of previously oppressive regimes. Expansive
claims may be tempting in order to convince international and na
tional audiences to fund and support trial efforts, but exaggerated as-

13. Professor of Law, Harvard University
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sertions are bound to yield critical and even hostile disappointment.

[p. 49]

In particular, Minow refuses to use deterrence as an argument for
international war crimes trials. She admits that we do not know
how to deter someone like Radovan KaradZic (p. 146). This stands
in contradiction to the assertions of more orthodox human rights
figures, like Madeleine Albright, Richard Goldstone, and David
Scheffer.
Minow, like Arendt during Nuremberg, is aware of the limita
tions of law to deal with the worst horrors. These are acts that go
beyond being criminal. Minow argues that mass violence requires
"more severe responses than would any ordinary criminal conduct,
even the murder of an individual. And yet, there is no punishment
that could express the proper scale of outrage" (p. 121). As Minow
admits, war crimes trials "depend for the most part upon symbolism
rather than effectuation of the rule of law" (p. 122). There are sim
ply too many perpetrators to be brought to justice, overwhelming
any court system and threatening political chaos. Thus, in order to
avoid cycles of violence, Minow would try to bring many lower
level perpetrators back into society, presumably instead of simply
purging them (p. 121). She knows that many of the guilty will es
cape punishment. Human rights trials, as we know them, are not
yet ready to deliver anything close to perfect justice.
Yet this is not at all how their advocates advertise them. Trials
are supposed to pin individual guilt upon individual criminals, so
that no one can point to an entire nation as guilty. This argument
comes up repeatedly, including in Minow's book (p. 123), but it has
never been a particularly convincing one. Tribunals never punish
anything remotely near the number of actual perpetrators, so the
guilt or innocence of vast numbers of individual Germans or Serbs
remains a mystery. In addition, some war criminals can never be
charged, not because they are innocent, but because there is scant
evidence of their crimes that would stand up in court. By purport
ing that a war crimes tribunal has actually established individual
responsibility in so many cases, some advocates of tribunals extend
to huge numbers of unindicted war criminals an undeserved moral
amnesty in addition to a de facto legal one.
There are a few things not to like in this book. Minow's book
has some jarring factual slips. She says that the U.N. set up the war
crimes tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia in 1992; it was in fact in 1993. 14
She points out that DraZen Erdemovic, an executioner at
Srebrenica in 1995, joined the Bosnian Army (p. 35), but neglects to
mention that he was in the Bosnian Serb Army when he committed
14. P. 34. AR.YEH NEIER, wAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND TiiE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 111 (1998).
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his murders15 - no trivial point, for uninformed readers may come
away from her version thinking that the Bosnian Army was respon
sible for the atrocities at Srebrenica: She writes that Stalin and
Churchill both considered summary execution for the Nazis (p. 29);
but she does not qualify this by pointing out that Stalin - true to
form - had actually suggested killing 100,000 Germans, while
Churchill furiously rejected Stalin's sweeping proposal and limited
the British blacklist to 50 or 100 top Axis �eaders, insisting on trials
for all the war crimirials not in the highest levels.16
Minow's most impressive contribution is her refusal to get swept
away. She is appropriately daunted by the difficulty of restoring
shattered societies and tries to consider a broad range of policy
tools that might help. And she is not so dazzled by the spectacle of
war crimes trials that she loses her professional skepticism.
III.
If Martha Minow is a quiet skeptic, Mark Osiel17 is a true be
liever with a twist. Not only ·does he believe that law can do great
things even amidst political chaos, he has written an unsettling book
on how to trim legalistic justice to the demands of theatricality.
Unlike Minow, who reacts to the limitations of trials by casting her
eye around the horizon for other alternatives, Osiel tries to recast
the institution of the trial so that it will fit his sweeping purposes
better.
Osiel's primary concern is not "the criminal law's more tradi
tional objectives" of deterrence and retribution (p. 2). As Minow
notes, it is by no means clear that human rights trials do a good job
of those two tasks. But Osiel has bigger fish to fry. Trials, he ar
gues, "when effective as public spectacle, stimulate public discus
sion in ways that foster the liberal virtues of toleration, moderation,
and civil respect. Criminal trials must be conducted with this peda
gogical purpose in mind" (p. 2).
To be sure, Osiel thinks that storytelling is already inherent in
trials in liberal courts (pp. 68-72), and that even "liberal show tri
als" - to use his striking phrase - must be conducted within the
limits of procedural fairness (p. 69). But the play is the thing. He
wants spectacular criminal trials in which both the judges and law
yers are explicitly concerned with what Osiel calls "the 'poetics' of
15. See DAVID RoHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA 128-29
(1997).
16. CAB 66/42, W.P. (43) 496, Churchill, "The Punishment of War Criminals," Nov. 9,
1943, at 265-66; Bohlen Minutes, Tripartite Dinner Meeting, November 29, 1943, 8:30 p.m.,
Soviet Embassy, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TIIB UNITED STATES: THE CoNFERENCES AT
CAIRO AND TEHRAN 1943, at 554 (1961).
17. Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
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legal storytelling" (p. 3). The drama of the courtroom is to be
turned into a "theater of ideas," focusing on "large questions of
collective memory and even national identity . . . . " (p. 3). This,
Osiel argues, will contribute to a "social solidarity" (p. 3). These
trials "should be unabashedly designed as monumental spectacles"
(p. 3). Or, as he puts it at another point, what is required is "some
measure of son et lumiere, smoke and mirrors, that is, some self
conscious dramaturgy by prosecutors and judges" (p. 7).
This is no small task, as Osiel admits. Having laid out his argu
ment, he spends much of the rest of the book qualifying it, until in
his conclusion he allows that "[i]t remains to be seen whether lib
eral courts can entirely reconcile the traditional, delimited functions
of criminal law with the dramaturgical demands of monumental di
dactics" (p. 293). In rambling pages that could have used a good
editor - there is far too much jargon and foggy prose - Osiel tries
to answer some objections to his planned smoke and mirrors;
mostly that a delusionary kind of history will be created.
Osiel makes much of the Buenos Aires trials for members of the
junta that waged Argentina's "dirty war." Among political scien
tists at least, these trials, and the subsequent amnesties, have a
more dubious reputation. As Samuel Huntington, perhaps the sin
gle most distinguished figure in the study of comparative politics,
writes, "the efforts to prosecute and punish in Argentina served
neither justice nor democracy and instead produced a moral and
political shambles. " 18
Osiel points out that the witnesses were selected from many re
gions and social classes, which, he argues, was meant to convey sub
tly the message that the junta had targeted not just leftists and
guerrillas but Argentines of all strata. This, he writes, "made a bet
ter story" (p. 237). He talks of Argentine story-telling as a way of
restoring civil society, and praises Argentina's President Raul Al
fonsfn for, among other things, packaging the junta trials in a single
hearing that could easily be televised (pp. 76-77). Unlike Minow,
Osiel seems interested only in trials. Truth commissions, for in
stance, according to the late Carlos Santiago Nino, the legal advisor
18. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 221 (1991). As a matter of social science, Osiel - a sociologist as well
as a law professor - stumbles by only looking at cases where there were trials. One needs to
make comparisons among cases. If trials are supposed to be the cause of social solidarity,
Osiel would need to look at cases of trials and cases of something other than trials. (In the
jargon of political science, Osiel's explanatory variable does not vary.) See GARY KING ET
AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
(1994). Minow does not use social scientific jargon - more credit to her - and she does not
make Osiel's mistake: she examines trials but also alternatives like truth commissions and
amnesties. Osiel also doesn't draw a systematic distinction between international and domes·
tic trials, even though the political dynamics are in many respects quite different. Osiel ad·
mits that his empirical work is anecdotal, and shies away from a rigorous social-scientific
study that would systematically ask what trials really do. P. 239.
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to Alfonsfn, and a hero of Osiel's, lack the requisite drama of a
courtroom confrontation (p. 15).
Osiel has great expectations from human rights trials, so long as
the trials are not too dryly legalistic. In this, he is in many ways
pitting himself against a more traditional view of war crimes trials.
One of Hannah Arendt's less controversial criticisms of Israel's trial
of Adolf Eichmann was a matter of due process (the court hadn't
allowed defense witnesses), as was one of her points of praise (the
court had given a more clear definition of crimes against humanity
than at Nuremberg).19 She did want justice to be seen to be done,
but her emphasis was on procedural fairness. She was withering
about Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's attempts to use
the trial as a showcase for Jewish suffering and for Zionism:
There is no doubt from the very beginnin g that it is Judge Landau
who sets the tone, and that he is doing his best, his very best, to pre
vent this trial from becoming a show trial under the influence of the
prosecutor's love of showmanship. . . . And B en-Gurion, rightly called
the "architect of the state," remains the invisible stage manager of the
proceedings. Not once does he attend a session; in the courtroom he
speaks with the voice of Gideon Hausner, the Attorney General, who,
representing the government, does his best, his very best, to obey his
master. And if, fortunately, his best often turns out not to be good
enough, the reason is that the trial is presided over by someone who
serves Justice as faithfully as Mr. Hausner serves the State of Israel.
Justice demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended, and
judged, and that all the other questions of seemingly greater import
- of "How could it happen?" and "Why did it happen?," of "Why
the Jews?" and "Why the Germans?," of "What was the role of other
nations?" and "What was the extent of co-responsibility on the side of
the Allies?," of "How could the Jews through their own leaders coop
erate in their own destruction?" and "Why did they go to their death
like lambs to the slaughter?" - be left in abeyance. Justice insists on
the importance of Adolf Eichmann . . . . On trial are his deeds, not
the sufferings of the Jews, not the German people or mankind, not
even anti-Semitism and racism.20

Osiel takes just the opposite position. He is endorsing showman
ship. As he writes in his conclusion: "To insist on punctilious judi
cial adherence to any notion of legal formalism at such times is to
guarantee the failure of courts to cultivate liberal memory when
this objective is vital to successful democratization" (p. 298).
19. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON
EVIL 251-52 {1963).

TIIE

BANALITY OF

20. Id. at 2-3. For a criticism of Arendt's controversial emphasis on Jewish passivity, see
GERSHOM SCHOLEM, On Eichmann, in ON JEWS AND JUDAISM IN Crusrs: SELECfED EssAYS
298 (Werner J. Dannhauser ed., 1976). For a less contentious account of the trial, see ToM
SEGER, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND TIIE HOLOCAUST 323-66 (1994).
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IV.
The best aspect of Osiel's book is its reminder that justice must
not only be done but also be seen to be done. This is a lesson that
the two current U.N. tribunals have largely failed to grasp.
Although the ex-Yugoslavia tribunal in The Hague is belatedly
starting work on some kind of an outreach program, to date the
tribunals have been spectacularly unsuccessful at showing their ef
forts off to Bosnians and Rwandans. It is a long way from Sarajevo
to The Hague, and from Kigali to Arusha; it is quite possible to be
in Sarajevo and have no idea that a trial is going on in The Hague.
This is particularly ironic because Sarajevo is a bustling hub of
international humanitarian organizations, all of them highly visible.
(The European Union took to painting Sarajevo trams in the colors
of EU flags - navy blue with gold stars - to show off its contribu
tion to the rebuilding of Bosnia; so did Saudi Arabia, so that trams
would line up, one Euro blue and the next with a desert scene and
images of Mecca.) The Hague tribunal is the only institution that is
invisible.
The Allies did not make the same mistake during Nuremberg.
They went to considerable lengths to explain to the German public
exactly what the Nazi leadership stood accused of: Allied forces
handed out pamphlets, screened documentaries, and made broad
casts on German radio.21 When Buchenwald was liberated,
American military police marched a thousand residents of nearby
Weimar through the camp to show them the nightmare reality
there.22 Like the Allies, Osiel understands that such crucial trials
must be part of the painful reeducation of a society.
But how to accomplish such a massive task? What exactly
would an Osiel-style trial look like, and why would this help a shat
tered society? It is at this point that the book begins to unravel.
Osiel places enormous faith in a clash of narratives, which he
thinks will make a trial compelling and thereby help to knit a soci
ety together. He argues that the "experience of disagreement itself,
although often unpleasant and divisive in many ways, nonetheless
creates a kind of joint understanding . . . . " (p. 43). Osiel sees trials
as a the first step in a dialogue when the other side is "initially un
willing " (p. 46). "At the very least," he writes,
through adversarial exchanges, when constrained by civility rules, we
achieve a sense of lived experience that is mutual. With better luck,
we gain some appreciation of how someone could, sincerely and in

21. See RICHARD L. MERRITT, DEMOCRACY IMPOSED: U.S. OCCUPATION POLICY AND
GERMAN PUBuc, 1945-1949, at 151 (1995).
22. See Forced Tour of Buchenwald: Weimar Residents Shown Round, TIMES (LoNDON),
Apr. 18, 1945, at 3.
THE
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good faith, come to think so differently from us about something so
fundamental to us both.
The experience of disagreement itself, although often unpleasant
and divisive in many ways, nonetheless creates a kind of joint under
standing: that we have both faced the issues dividing us, that we are
united in caring deeply about them and about what the other thinks of
them. The phenomenology of this interpersonal experience nowhere
has adequately been captured in social or political theory. But who
among us can deny having had it, and having found it not altogether
unpleasant? [pp. 42-43]

Victims of a war can deny it. Osiel's bookish formulation seems
less than relevant to Bosnia and to the very societies that he is os
tensibly writing about. The "experience of disagreement" is not at
all the same thing as a war or civil conflict. Disagreeing in Congress
over Medicare may not be "altogether unpleasant." Disagreeing in
the Bosnian parliament over who is plotting a genocide - as the
Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Radovan KaradZic and Bosnian
President Alija Izetbegovic did shortly before Slobodan Milosevic's
wars in Yugoslavia spread into Bosnia - is in fact a good deal
worse than altogether unpleasant. And that was before the war.
It is true that some of the defendants at the U.N. tribunal in The
Hague, for instance, have come to have a less jaundiced view of
U.N. justice in the course of their trials. They have noticed that
they don't get tortured or starved, that the judges are not in cahoots
with the prosecution, that they might get acquitted, and so on. This,
however, does not seem likely to rise to the level of deliberation as
theorists of deliberative democracy like Amy Gutmann or Seyla
Benhabib would recognize it.

In particular, Osiel is worried that human rights trials are some
times too easy, that the conviction of the defendants will lack the
requisite punch. In order for the clash of narratives to fit his bill,
Osiel thinks, the prosecution and defense must .be allowed
to widen the spatial and temporal frame of courtroom storytelling in
ways that allow litigants to flesh out their competing interpretations
of recent history, and to argue these before an attentive public. Only
in this way can the debate within the courtroom be made to resonate
with the public debate beyond the courtroom walls. Just as hard cases
can make bad law, so too easy cases can make for poor drama (i.e.,
within the genre of the theatre of ideas, as a basis for discursive soli
darity) . [p . 296]

For Osiel, trials will only be able to "weav[e] their strictly legal con
clusions into a plausible and relatively capacious narrative about
the country's recent conflagration" if they "ensure that all antago
nists feel they have received a fair hearing" (p. 298).

All antagonists? This seems a bit much. Hermann Goring, in
jail at Nuremberg, was convinced that his trial was purely a matter
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of victor's justice, and that the trial was rigged. As he told the
prison psychiatrist,
[a]s far as the trial is concerned, it's just a cut-and-dried political af
fair, and I'm prepared for the consequences. I have no doubt that the
press will play a bigger part in the decision than the judges. - And
I'm sure that the Russian and French judges, at least, already have
their instructions. I can answer for anything I've done, and can't an
swer for anything I haven't done. But the victors are the judges . . . I
know what's in store for me.23

As it turned out, Goring held up well on the stand under question
ing by Robert Jackson, the American prosecutor. But one would
no more wish to make the success of a war crimes trial contingent
on the opinion of Goring than one would wish to judge a murder
trial a failure because the murderer didn't think he got to air his
motivations to his heart's content.
Is it really necessary that a Goring or a Karadzic not just get
their day in court, but get to have it to their liking? There are times
that call for dialogue, but the situations under discussion in Osiel's
book tend to be those furthest removed from the ideals of dialogue.
In practice, Osiel's suggestion of widening "the spatial and tempo
ral frame of courtroom storytelling" would mean the unenlighten
ing experience of, say, hearing a . Serb concentration camp guard
attempt to justify himself by talking about the Battle of Kosovo
Polje in 1389, or about how the "Turks" (the Bosnian Serb national
ist epithet of choice for Bosnia's largely secular Muslims, who are
roughly as Turkish as Karadzic is) were plotting to make Serb
women wear the veil. The situations are depressingly close to being
zero-sum.
Nor is it clear that a new consensus will only occur from dia
logue with the perpetrators. It is clear that the radicals in Serbia
and Croatia need to be weaned off their nationalist myths, but it is
less clear that courtroom dialogues with the worst offenders will do
the trick. The courtroom appearances of Goran Jelisic (who called
himself "the Serb Adolf") and Tihomir Blaskic (the Bosnian Croat
commander who led the sack of Bosnia's Lasva Valley) in The
Hague are a matter of imposition, just as the Dayton Peace Accords
only worked because they were imposed by NATO's military force
and just as the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan was a mat
ter of imposition. Jelisic did not just misunderstand the Bosnians;
he hated the Bosnians.
Much of the virtue of a human rights trial is precisely that it is
not a dialogue. The criminal is stuck. He is not there because he
wants to be, or to tell his story. He is not being improved by the
experience. He is being judged, and then punished and humiliated.
23.

G.M. GILBERT, NUREMBERG DIARY 12-13 (1947).

May 1999)

2115

War Crimes

This might be a source of some comfort to the victims. Watching
such a spectacle in The Hague, what one appreciates about a war
crimes trial is precisely that it no longer allows the war criminal to
set his terms. During the war, the war criminal had the pleasure of
the exercise of extraordinary power; now he is powerless. During
the war, the war criminal could use his brute force to get attention
for his paranoias and bigotries; now he is stuck in a forum where
the law gives not a fig for these fictions, only for the stark documen
tation of his cruelty.
This is not to say that such imposition is an easy thing. But this,
too, points to another problem in Osiel's argument. In most of the
recent wave of democratizations, the ancien regime has negotiated
itself out of power, usually insisting on amnesty as a precondition
for its quiet exit. In a few cases, like Greece and Romania, the
authoritarian regime suddenly collapsed, making trials or execu
tions possible. But it is unusual to be able to impose one's political
will as the Allies did after World War Il.
The pattern is one of amnesty. When the dictators and thugs
have made amnesty the price of their ouster, there is scant prospect
of successful human rights trials. In Argentina, the case in the book
with which Osiel has firsthand experience, Menem eventually de
cided to issue amnesties. Osiel admits at one point that attempting
to prosecute the junta, as Raul Alfonsfn unsuccessfully did, risked a
military coup and the end of civilian ·rule (pp. 162-64)
a steep
price to pay for a narrative.
-

If we are in the narrative business, then the moral story of the
democratization may come off as an inglorious one that buries the
past. Osiel admits that there were rather ignominious political cal
culations going on in MacArthur's decision to let Hirohito off with
out prosecution, as well as in Alfonsfn's legal team, which had to
mollify the military during the junta trials. But as Osiel puts it, if
MacArthur's team had ever "honestly explained the reasons for
their exclusion of the Emperor they would have made a mockery of
the trial, discrediting it altogether" (p. 243). Alfonsfn, too, Osiel
writes, would have made a mockery-of the Buenos Aires trials if he
had publicly admitted that he was scrapping the trials because he
was spooked by the unruly military. Osiel also admits that
Alfonsfn's pragmatic motivations were clear to most everyone ob
serving the Argentine scene (pp. 243-44).
The problem is that such political amnesties underlie most of
the recent democratizations. Osiel is recommending that we pursue
narratives that, by his own account, will make "a mockery" of the
trials among those people who grasp the underlying politics.24 It
24. Osiel, in two confusing passages, argues that amnesties are also sometimes good for
social solidarity. He writes: "rewriting the national story by such legal devices as pardons,
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may be true, as Ernest Renan famously said, that "[g]etting its his
tory wrong is part of being a nation."25 But one would like to think
that there might be better ways to build a democratic citizenry.

v.
Minow, in her skepticism and modesty, is much more typical of
liberal political thought on the question of postwar trials. In Legal
ism, which remains the single most thought-provoking work on the
moral and practical meaning of political trials, the political theorist
Judith Shklar wrote:
It is not that legalism and law, even in the narrowest juristic sense of
the term, do not educate people and do not promote specific values
and ideologies, but that their method is limited, and with it the scope
of their influence upon the lives of individuals . . . . On the political
level it is thus the manipulative state that is the real rival of the legal
istic state, and the policy of inducement, whether by propaganda or
by terror and related pressures, competes with the policy of
legalism.26

These kinds of trials already operate under a huge burden.
They must be seen as fair, even in conditions where the require
ments of due process must be stretched and where there is massive
public and political pressure. If the trial is international - as in the
case of Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the two current U.N. tribunals then national court systems are being amalgamated on the fly, often
in ways that are baffling to the participants. At the London Confer
ence held to design the Nuremberg court, the American, British,
and French delegations had to contend with a revenge-minded and
Vishinsky-inspired Soviet delegation, and at Nuremberg they had to
deal with Vishinsky himself. If the trial is national, then it will be
hugely politicized, under pressures that might tear either society or
the justice system apart. These trials tend to be stretched to the
breaking point anyway. One might be forgiven for not rushing to
add to the burden.
In the aftermath of war and slaughter, it is entirely possible that
nothing will work to bind up wounds except the passage of time,
maybe measured in generations. Minow and Osiel are both looking
for something better and quicker, which is a noble aspiration. But
Minow's particular strength is her modesty in the face of such an
enormous, miserable task.
amnesties, and acts of clemency can sometimes greatly further the restoration of solidarity at
such times.'' P. 132. He also notes that the Tokyo war crimes trials "united the Japanese
populace in substantial rejection of the story they sought to tell.'' P. 206.
25. Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce que c'est une nation? 7-8 (Conference faite en Sorbonne le 11
mars 1882), in E.J. HoBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME,
MYIH, REALITY 12 (2d ed. 1992).
26. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 120 (1964).

